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SIMULATION OF SHIP MOVEMENT 
AFTER STEERING SYSTEM FAILURE TO DETERMINE 
THE WORST CASE SCENARIO OF GROUNDING
ABSTRACT
Ship grounding is one of the primary maritime naviga-
tion casualties and a result of an error made by the navigat-
ing officer, of a technical failure on vital ship equipment or 
of force majeure. In order to decrease the risk of ground-
ing in such cases, this paper explores the ship movement 
during navigation when an extraordinary event occurs, such 
as steering system failure that affects the vessel’s direction 
directly and speed indirectly. One way to determine the ship 
movement in such circumstances is by simulating the ship 
movement on the navigational simulator according to the 
predefined scenarios, as explained in this paper. A total of 
60 scenarios were researched, in the process of which ship 
type, ship size, ship speed and rudder deflection angle were 
varied. During the simulation, all relevant data concerning 
current movement of the ship and a graphical display of the 
performed simulation were recorded every 30 seconds. On 
the basis of the simulation results it is possible to determine 
the worst case scenario which can be used to define the con-
sequence of grounding, one of the parameters necessary for 
the assessment of the risk of grounding.
KEY WORDS
risk of grounding, failure of the steering system, ship move-
ment simulation, selection of the worst case scenario
1. INTRODUCTION
The term “risk” is used in everyday life and can be 
applied in many procedures and activities. According 
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) [1], 
risk is the degree of probability that an undesired 
event will occur along with the extent of consequences 
of the event within a certain period of time, i.e. the 
combination of the frequency of the casualty and the 
severity of its consequences. Given their magnitude, 
maritime risks belong to the group of great risks, right 
next to risks of natural catastrophes, war risks and 
risks in industries of processing and manufacturing 
dangerous materials.
Maritime risks represent risks of occurrence of 
dangers specific to maritime traffic. This definition de-
fines risks broadly and includes all risks that can take 
place during ship voyage, ship’s stay in port, loading/
unloading operations, repair, as well as financial risks, 
etc. Considering the aim of this paper, the definition 
should be narrowed to maritime navigational risks.
Maritime navigational risks are risks of occurrence 
of those dangers that are characteristic to maritime 
traffic and take place while the vessel is underway. Ac-
cording to the International Regulations for Preventing 
Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREG), the term underway 
signifies that the vessel is not anchored, moored or 
grounded.
Various methods are used for risk assessment, 
but they do not answer the questions whether the as-
sessed risk is too great, should certain measures of 
risk reduction be taken, what is the effect of the mea-
sures implemented, etc. This very fact imposed the 
need for determining the so-called acceptable risk that 
demands implementing the risk management princi-
ple. In this process, the adequate risk assessment is 
not qualitative but quantitative risk assessment that 
estimates the risk of a certain activity assigning it a 
certain numerical value. The acceptable risk repre-
sents the level of risk society is aware of and willing 
to accept.
Ship grounding is one of the most common mari-
time navigation casualties that take place at sea, 
whereat human casualties are rare, but pollution with 
negative effects to the environment is not. The accept-
able risk principle does not demand complete elimina-
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tion of the risk of grounding, but solicits that the risk 
of grounding be acceptable regardless of the type of 
vessel, type of cargo or the area in which the vessel 
navigates.
To enable determining the acceptable value of 
the risk of grounding, it is necessary to define possi-
ble scenarios of ship grounding and to examine ship 
movement in various scenarios. The aim of this paper 
is to define and analyze ship movement scenarios that 
lead to grounding and are result of the steering system 
failure. Therefore, the paper analyzes possible ship 
grounding causes, types of grounding, as well as ship 
systems that affect the facility of ship direction control 
directly and ship speed indirectly.
Based on the conducted analyses, the scenarios 
for different ship types and sizes, examined on the 
navigational simulator Transas NTPro 4000 installed 
at the Faculty of Maritime Studies in Rijeka, are pre-
defined. The navigational simulator used possesses 
Certificate “Class A – Standard for certification of mari-
time simulators No. 2.14” issued by the Det Norske 
Veritas – DNV. The results of the simulations enabled 
determining the ship movement trajectory upon the oc-
currence of an extraordinary event during navigation. 
For reasons of using the obtained results for assessing 
the risk of grounding, ship trajectories were analyzed 
with the assumption that the vessel navigates within 
a limited fairway. The obtained results enable select-
ing the worst case scenario, for which the severity of 
the consequence can be determined in the next phase 
and risk magnitude can finally be estimated.
2. GROUNDING CAUSES AND TYPES
Ship navigation is determined by the ship’s posi-
tion on a certain part of the fairway from the place of 
departure to the place of arrival. During the voyage, 
in a given period of time the vessel changes direction 
and speed. Navigation itself can be viewed from two 
possible aspects:
 – during the voyage all onboard systems are func-
tioning properly, and the person managing the ship 
practices “good seamanship”,
 – during the voyage an extraordinary event occurs, 
which affects the possibility of maintaining the de-
sired direction and/or speed.
The former represents ship navigation in the fair-
way that meets safe navigation conditions for the con-
sidered vessel. In such cases, ship navigation can be 
considered safe, with the assumption that all systems 
onboard function properly and that the person manag-
ing the ship practices “good seamanship”.
The latter presupposes an extraordinary event oc-
currence that will disrupt maintaining the desired direc-
tion and/or speed. In addition, it is assumed that the 
extraordinary events (failures) occurred in the steer-
ing system and/or the propulsion system. It is presup-
posed that the person managing the ship and other 
crew members practice “good seamanship” in the situ-
ation of this type of an extraordinary event as well.
Generally, grounding is a type of maritime casu-
alty that involves contact of the vessel’s hull with sea 
bed that results in damaging the underwater part of 
the vessel’s hull, especially the bottom of the vessel, 
and that can lead to flooding of the vessel’s compart-
ments. Grounding causes great load to the structure of 
the vessel and is one of the most significant maritime 
casualties with regard to the consequences. In minor 
casualties, it can result in lesser hull damage, while in 
severe casualties grounding can cause oil spills, loss 
of human lives or loss of the entire vessel.
Groundings are most commonly divided into two 
basic groups:
 – groundings in which the propulsion system was 
generating propulsion at the moment of grounding 
(Powered Grounding), and
 – groundings in which the propulsion system was not 
generating propulsion at the moment of ground-
ings, and grounding was not a result of the remain-
ing kinetic energy of the vessel but of the effect of 
the external forces to the vessel (wind, waves, sea 
current) (Drift Grounding).
Apart from these basic groups most commonly 
mentioned in literature, there are other types of 
grounding, such as grounding of an anchored ship, 
grounding of a ship onboard which an extraordinary 
event took place, etc. In the continuation of this paper, 
ship movement during voyage after the occurrence of 
an extraordinary event that suggests a failure in the 
steering system is examined.
Grounding in which the propulsion system was gen-
erating propulsion at the moment of grounding occurs 
when the vessel is moving forward or backward under 
propulsion, and the most common cause of ground-
ing is navigational error [2]. In [3] the authors state 
that the primary reasons for this type of grounding are 
fundamental errors in the process of voyage planning 
and/or executing. Errors in the navigational charts, or 
improper updating of navigational charts, are the sec-
ond most common reason of this type of grounding.
Groundings in which the propulsion system was 
not generating propulsion at the moment of ground-
ing, i.e. grounding was caused by wind, waves and sea 
currents, mostly take place after a mechanical failure 
[2], such as engine failure or the failure of the steer-
ing system. Unfavourable weather conditions along 
with impossibility or inefficiency of anchorage or un-
availability of towage are primary causes of this type of 
grounding, Figure 1.
Depending on the type of the sea bottom that the 
vessel grounded on, groundings are divided into [4]:
 – “soft” groundings, and
 – “hard” groundings.
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“Soft” grounding is grounding of a vessel on a san-
dy or silty sea bottom, and “hard” grounding is when 
the vessel grounds on a rocky sea bottom.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF PROPER 
OPERATION OF SHIP SYSTEMS TO SHIP 
MOVEMENT
In view of the aim of this paper, the inability to con-
trol the vessel’s direction or speed is considered an 
extraordinary event. In order to properly examine ship 
movement after the occurrence of an extraordinary 
event on the navigational simulator, it is necessary to 
define the possible scenarios. It is known that the ship 
speed is controlled by using the propulsion engine, 
while the direction is controlled by the appropriate rud-
der deflection. This is true for most vessels, but there 
are vessels that facilitate various means of direction 
control (for example, ships with azimuth thrusters, wa-
ter jet propulsion, etc). Possible cause-and-effect se-
quence of the analyzed extraordinary events is shown 
in Figure 2.
Therefore, hereafter the paper analyzes ship sys-
tems that directly or indirectly affect the capacity to 
control ship speed and direction, namely:
 – propulsion engine system,
 – steering system,
 – power supply system.
In case of a failure in the propulsion engine system, 
time necessary for repairing the failure and restoring 
proper system operation depends on the cause of the 
problem in the propulsion system. The crew is able to 
eliminate some failures within shorter or longer peri-
ods of time, while other failures require towing the ves-
sel to the place where the engine repair work is to be 
performed.
If the vessel is near enough to the grounding area 
at the moment of propulsion system failure, it can be 
assumed that the vessel’s crew will probably not be 
able to eliminate the failure from the moment of the 
extraordinary event occurrence till grounding. Further-
more, it is not certain that the steering system failure 
will take place along with propulsion engine failure. 
This assumption allows for the scenario in which a pro-
pulsion engine failure takes place, the vessel contin-
ues to move due to inertia at the moment of the failure 
occurrence, and the steering gear is used to keep the 
vessel within the planned trajectory. Among other fac-
tors, efficiency of the steering gear also depends on 
the velocity of water inflow to the rudder. Decreased 
flow of water roundabout the rudder causes reduc-
tion of rudder efficiency, and at a certain point, it is no 
longer possible to control the direction of the vessel’s 
movement by the appropriate rudder deflection. The 
vessel then continues to move without any control by 
the vessel’s crew, and further movement depends on 
the remaining inertia and the resulting force of the ex-
ternal conditions.
In case of propulsion system failure, it is possible to 
use the anchoring system for the purposes of ground-
ing prevention. However, to do so, certain conditions 
must be met, such as appropriate water depth, suffi-
ciently low ship speed, type of sea bottom appropriate 
for anchorage, etc., that significantly limit this option; 
thus, it is not taken into consideration in this paper.
Tugboats can also be used to control ship move-
ment in case of propulsion system failure. Availability 
of tugboats in case of an extraordinary even depends 
on their position in relation to the location of the ex-
traordinary event and their disposability. As the as-
sumed extraordinary events can occur at any part of 
the fairway, and not just in port areas, the possibility 
of using tugboats in case of an emergency event is not 
considered.
In cases of steering gear failure, possible causes 
of incapacity of rudder control are failures in the sys-
tem of command transmission between the navigation 
bridge and the rudder, failures on the steering system 
power supply, and failures on the steering device. The 
possibility of repairing the failure or using the auxiliary 
steering system depends on the problem disabling 
rudder control.
Regardless of the cause of the failure, the result of 
the steering system failure is a certain angle of rudder 
deflection that is impossible to rectify. Possible angles 
of rudder deflection vary from minimum angle (rudder 
in the centre, or a small rudder deflection port or star-
board) to maximum rudder deflection angle.
Considering the above, in defining the ship move-
ment scenario to be examined on the navigational 
simulator, different rudder deflection values after the 
occurrence of the extraordinary event will be assumed. 
It will also be assumed that the crew was not able to 
enable one of the steering means within a short period 
after the failure took place.
Figure 1 - Liberian bulk carrier "Fedra" grounded
in the southernmost part of Gibraltar
Source: www.maritime.com, 09/09/2012
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Based on the factors mentioned above, in this re-
search the scenarios will be assumed in which a steer-
ing gear failure and a certain rudder deflection take 
place and cannot be repaired, but the engine can be 
utilized, and it is assumed that the person conducting 
the ship will stop the engine. In such cases, it can be as-
sumed that the engine may run astern, which depends 
on the engine characteristics and the ability of the per-
son conducting the vessel to make crucial decisions 
[5]. When the vessel is at a considerable distance from 
the coast or when she navigates at low speed, such a 
scenario is possible, but when the vessel is near the 
coast or navigates at high speed, this scenario is very 
doubtful. Thus, in defining the scenarios, the authors 
of this paper assume that while the vessel speed is 
decreasing, the engine will not run astern.
Failure of the power supply system does not direct-
ly affect the vessel speed and direction, but disables 
the systems on which the possibility of vessel control 
depends (propulsion engine system and steering sys-
tem). The power supply system usually consists of two 
or more generators, and an emergency generator. 
When the vessel navigates in dangerous areas, the 
crew must ensure power supply with the minimum of 
double redundancy, i.e. two or more generators in the 
network.
It should be noted that there are other extraordi-
nary events and other consequences that can occur 
onboard a vessel, but these are omitted in defining the 
scenarios due to the aim of this paper.
4. RESEARCH OF SHIP MOVEMENT AT THE 
OCCURRENCE OF AN EXTRAORDINARY 
EVENT
In determining the probability of grounding, which 
is one of the elements necessary for risk assessment, 
the trajectory the vessel will follow in various scenarios 
of an extraordinary event should be defined. The ship 
trajectory can be obtained in the following manners:
 – in situ – determining various trajectories using a 
real vessel and a specific navigation area;
 – determining ship movement trajectories using the 
existing track models;
 – determining ship movement trajectories using a 
navigational simulator.
In situ trajectory determination for different ship 
types and sizes under various conditions requires con-
siderable amount of time and costs. Undoubtedly, this 
method provides the most accurate data and may be 
considered feasible. However, for reasons of neces-
sary time and costs, it is not often applied.
Ship track models have been studied by a number 
of authors [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Such studies are limited to 
one or several different ship types and sizes for which 
model calibration was performed using a certain ves-
sel, the movement of which was to be modelled. The 
disadvantage of such models lies in the fact that cer-
tain simplifications and neglect have emerged in the 
process in order for the model not to be too compli-
cated, thus not all ship types and sizes can be applied.
Navigational simulators have become an inevitable 
part of education of students and mariners on ships 
alike. In addition to this primary role, navigational sim-
ulators are increasingly frequently utilized for analyz-
ing ship movement trajectory, and the results obtained 
in this manner are used for fairway projecting. The ad-
vantages of using the simulator in comparison with 
the models described above are that the trajectories 
of man-navigated vessels are researched, so not only 
model behaviour is examined, but human behaviour 
as well.
As is the case with models of various authors, the 
shortcoming of the simulation models is that they sim-
ulate movement of only certain ship types and sizes 
for which there are data bases available in the sim-
ulator. For the purposes of this research, ship types 
that would cause severe consequences in case of 
grounding were chosen in the navigational simulator. 
According to the selected criterion, those are tankers, 
because of the type of cargo, and large bulk carriers, 








affecting the capacity of





Figure 2 - Cause-and-effect sequence
of the described extraordinary events
When the main generators cannot be utilized, the 
power supply emergency generator is started that can 
supply the steering gear, but not the main engine. 
Whether there will be sufficient time to restore all 
systems to avoid grounding primarily depends on the 
distance between the vessel and the coast, and the 
speed of the vessel at the moment of the occurrence 
of the extraordinary event.
Consequences that cause power supply system 
failure assume the same scenarios as already de-
scribed in this chapter.
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lected ship types represent specific types of vessels 
with greater water plane coefficient among which no 
significant differences in the shape of the hull and 
characteristics of propulsion and steering systems are 
present which allows a more valid analysis of the ob-
tained results (Table 1).
After having selected certain ship types, the re-
searched scenario was determined, in the process of 
which ship type, ship size, ship speed and rudder de-
flection angle were fluctuated.
For each ship type, four rudder deflection angles 
(5°, 10°, 20° and 35°) and three different speeds 
(minimum, maximum, and 10 kn – which is approxi-
mately the arithmetic mean of the minimum and the 
maximum speed of the selected vessels) were simu-
lated.
A total of 60 scenarios were studied, and during 
the simulation, all relevant data concerning the cur-
rent movement of the ship and a graphical display of 
the performed simulation (Figure 3) were recorded ev-
ery 30 seconds. Numerical results of one of the per-
formed simulations are shown in Table 2 and the se-
lected scenarios are shown in Table 3.
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION REGARDING 
THE RESULTS OBTAINED BY RESEARCH 
ON THE NAVIGATIONAL SIMULATOR
The results obtained by the simulation on the nau-
tical simulator were analyzed with respect to the risk 
of grounding during navigation in a limited area. The 
limited navigation area is a part of the fairway where 
navigational dangers, such as reefs, rocks, wrecks, 
shallow water areas, etc., are located close to the ves-
sel. Fairways of such characteristics are located in ap-
Table 1 - Overview of selected ship types and sizes









Chemical tanker 44,288 182.6 27.3 10.9 5.4 14.5
Oil tanker 77,100 242.8 32.2 12.5 5.5 15.0
VLCC 4 137,092 249.9 44.0 15.4 5.8 14.7
Bulk carrier 202,000 290.0 46.0 18.1 6.0 14.6
VLCC 2 321,260 332.0 58.0 20.8 5.5 15.7
Legend:  Loa –  Length overall, B – Breadth, T – Draft, DSA – Dead slow ahead,  
FA – Full ahead, VLCC – Very large crude carrier
Source: Navigational simulator TRANSAS NTPro 4000
Figure 3 - Graphical display of the performed simulation
Source: Navigational simulator TRANSAS NTPro 4000
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proaches to ports and in ports, and in narrow channels 
or straits between island coasts and/or the inland.
Ship trajectories obtained on the basis of a certain 
scenario are analyzed for the case when the grounding 
isobath is 500 or 1,000 m from the planned trajectory. 
The grounding scenario analyzed is shown in Figure 4.
As determining the risk of grounding requires 
knowledge of grounding consequences as well as of 
the probability of occurrence, the ship speed was par-
ticularly analyzed. Ship speed and mass are the key 
parameters for determining the ship kinetic energy 
which is one of the factors necessary for assessing 
Table 2 - Numerical display of records of the performed simulation
Exercise: Ship movement simulation during an extraordinary event occurrence.nti
Own ship: OS 7 - Oil tanker (Dis.77,100 t)
Time interval: 00:00:00 - 00:16:14
Step: 00:00:30
TIME LAT LON COG SOG HDG LOG SET DRIFT RUD ROT RPM L
s ° ° ° kn ° kn ° kn ° °/min -
0 49.99999 9.99999 000 15.008 000 15.008 090 0.0 0 0.00 109
30 50.00207 9.99999 000 15.053 002 15.048 271 0.4 5 7.00 109
60 50.00417 9.99991 003 15.222 007 15.183 276 1.1 5 13.00 109
90 50.00627 9.99961 008 15.020 015 14.913 284 1.8 5 18.00 51
120 50.00825 9.99897 016 14.160 025 13.976 294 2.3 5 21.00 43
150 50.01003 9.99794 025 13.210 036 12.977 305 2.5 5 21.00 39
180 50.01156 9.99657 035 12.252 046 11.998 316 2.5 5 21.00 34
210 50.01282 9.99494 045 11.357 057 11.098 327 2.4 5 20.00 2
240 50.01380 9.99314 054 10.464 067 10.208 337 2.3 5 19.00 0
270 50.01452 9.99128 064 9.678 076 9.433 346 2.2 5 18.00 0
300 50.01500 9.98942 072 8.976 085 8.742 355 2.0 5 17.00 0
330 50.01528 9.98760 080 8.358 094 8.136 003 1.9 5 16.00 0
360 50.01539 9.98586 088 7.818 102 7.609 011 1.8 5 15.00 0
390 50.01536 9.98423 096 7.331 109 7.131 019 1.7 5 14.00 0
420 50.01520 9.98272 103 6.906 116 6.718 025 1.6 5 13.00 0
450 50.01495 9.98132 109 6.522 122 6.344 032 1.5 5 12.00 0
480 50.01462 9.98005 115 6.178 129 6.008 038 1.4 5 12.00 0
510 50.01422 9.97891 121 5.867 135 5.706 044 1.4 5 11.00 0
540 50.01378 9.97788 127 5.586 140 5.432 050 1.3 5 10.00 0
570 50.01330 9.97698 132 5.330 146 5.182 055 1.2 5 10.00 0
600 50.01279 9.97618 137 5.096 151 4.955 060 1.2 5 10.00 0
630 50.01226 9.97548 142 4.882 156 4.746 065 1.1 5 9.00 0
660 50.01172 9.97488 147 4.685 160 4.555 070 1.1 5 9.00 0
690 50.01118 9.97437 151 4.503 165 4.378 074 1.1 5 8.00 0
720 50.01063 9.97395 156 4.334 169 4.214 079 1.0 5 8.00 0
750 50.01008 9.97360 160 4.178 173 4.062 083 1.0 5 8.00 0
780 50.00954 9.97332 164 4.031 177 3.918 087 0.9 5 7.00 0
810 50.00901 9.97311 168 3.896 181 3.788 091 0.9 5 7.00 0
840 50.00849 9.97297 172 3.769 185 3.664 095 0.9 5 7.00 0
870 50.00797 9.97288 175 3.650 189 3.548 098 0.9 5 7.00 0
900 50.00748 9.97284 179 3.537 192 3.439 102 0.8 5 6.00 0
930 50.00699 9.97284 182 3.431 196 3.335 105 0.8 5 6.00 0
960 50.00653 9.97289 186 3.331 199 3.238 109 0.8 5 6.00 0
Source: Navigational simulator TRANSAS NTPro 4000
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the extent of damage caused by grounding. In turn, 
the extent of damage determines the consequence of 
grounding.
On the basis of the performed simulations of ship 
movements after the occurrence of the extraordinary 
event, the following analyses of the obtained results 
have been conducted:
 – analysis of ship speed with various rudder deflec-
tions for the same initial speed when the grounding 
isobath is 500 or 1,000 metres from the vessel’s 
planned trajectory,
 – analysis of ship speed with different initial speeds, 
but with the same rudder deflection when the 
grounding isobath is 500 or 1,000 metres from the 
vessel’s planned trajectory,
 – analysis of ship speed for vessels of different sizes 
for the same scenario.
By comparing the ship movement simulations 
with the minimum rudder deflection angle from 5° 
to a maximum of 35°, a conclusion was drawn that 
at the moment of grounding, when the grounding iso-
bath is located 500 metres from the planned trajec-
tory, the speeds are on the average 25% higher when 
rudder deflection angle is smaller, notwithstanding 
greater distance passed and longer time until ground-
ing. Analysis of the same ship movement scenarios, 
but when grounding isobath is 1,000 metres from the 
planned trajectory, shows that speeds at the moment 
of grounding are on the average 60% higher when rud-





Position of the vessel at the moment
of the extraordinary event occurence







The rudder remains deflected by a
certain angle. The person navigating
the ship stops the engine to
reduce grounding consequences
The location of grounding
caused by the
extraordinary event
Figure 4 - Analyzed grounding scenario
Table 3 - Overview of the results of the performed simulations




Ship speed after the deviation 
from the planned trajectory
500 m 1,000 m
m/s kn m/s kn
Chemical tanker 44,288
5.4
5 1.3 2.5 0.7 1.4
10 1.3 2.5 0.6 1.3
20 1.2 2.4 - -
35 1.0 2.0 - -
10.0
5 2.6 5.0 1.5 2.9
10 2.5 4.9 1.4 2.7
20 2.4 4.7 - -
35 2.1 4.1 - -
14.5
5 5.6 10.8 4.7 7.8
10 5.4 10.5 - -
20 5.0 9.8 - -
35 3.8 7.4 - -
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Ship speed after the deviation 
from the planned trajectory
500 m 1,000 m
m/s kn m/s kn
Oil tanker 77,100
5.5
5 1.6 3.2 1.2 2.4
10 1.6 3.1 1.1 2.2
20 1.5 2.9 1.0 1.9
35 1.3 2.5 0.7 1.4
10.0
5 3.1 5.9 2.3 4.5
10 3.0 5.8 2.2 4.2
20 2.8 5.4 1.8 3.5
35 2.4 4.7 1.4 2.7
15.0
5 5.2 10.0 4.0 7.8
10 5.1 9.9 3.9 7.6
20 5.0 9.8 3.6 7.0
35 4.2 8.2 2.3 4.5
VLCC 4 137,092
5.8
5 2.0 3.8 1.5 3.0
10 1.9 3.8 1.5 2.8
20 1.8 3.5 1.3 2.5
35 1.6 3.1 1.0 1.9
10.0
5 3.4 6.6 2.7 5.2
10 3.3 6.4 2.6 5.0
20 3.1 6.1 2.2 4.4
35 2.8 5.4 1.7 3.4
14.7
5 5.6 11.0 4.7 9.2
10 5.5 10.8 4.5 8.6
20 5.4 10.5 4.1 7.9
35 4.5 8.8 2.7 5.2
Bulk currier 202,000
6.0
5 2.3 4.5 2.0 3.8
10 2.3 4.5 1.9 3.8
20 2.2 4.3 1.7 3.4
35 2.0 3.8 1.4 2.6
10.0
5 3.9 7.7 3.4 6.5
10 3.9 7.7 3.3 6.4
20 3.7 7.2 3.0 5.8
35 3.3 6.5 2.4 4.6
14.6
5 6.6 12.9 6.0 11.8
10 6.5 12.6 5.8 11.3
20 6.1 11.9 5.0 9.7
35 5.2 10.2 - -
VLCC 2 321,260
5.5
5 1.7 3.3 1.3 2.6
10 1.7 3.3 1.3 2.5
20 1.6 3.1 1.1 2.2
35 1.4 2.7 0.9 1.7
10.0
5 3.2 6.3 2.5 5.0
10 3.2 6.2 2.5 4.8
20 3.0 5.9 2.2 4.3
35 2.7 5.2 1.7 3.3
15.7
5 5.8 11.3 4.9 9.4
10 5.8 11.2 4.6 9.0
20 5.3 10.3 3.9 7.6
35 4.5 8.7 2.8 5.4
Table 3 - Overview of the results of the performed simulations (continued)
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basis of the shown results, it can be concluded that 
during navigation in narrow fairways, the rudder de-
flection angle has less effect on the grounding speed 
than in wider fairways.
The maximum speed simulated is on the average 
2.6 times higher than the minimum simulated speed. 
The ship speed at the moment of grounding when the 
grounding isobath is 500 metres from the planned tra-
jectory in the movement simulation with maximum ini-
tial speed is on the average 3.2 times higher than the 
ship speed at the moment of grounding in the move-
ment simulation with the minimum initial speed for the 
same rudder deflection angle. The results of the same 
simulations when the grounding isobath is 1,000 me-
tres from the planned trajectory are very similar. The 
above mentioned results lead to the conclusion that a 
certain correlation is present between the difference 
between the minimum and the maximum initial speed, 
and the difference of the grounding speed with respect 
to the initial speeds. Furthermore, it is completely logi-
cal to conclude that lower initial speed results in lower 
grounding speed.
With larger vessels, the speed at the moment of 
grounding for the same scenarios was higher than with 
smaller vessels, except for the largest simulated ship 
“VLCC 2”. Although the displacement of “Bulk carri-
ers” is almost 5 times greater than the displacement 
of “Chemical Tankers”, when the grounding isobath is 
500 metres from the planned trajectory, at the mo-
ment of grounding, the speed is on the average 85% 
greater than the speed at the moment of grounding 
of a smaller vessel with the minimum simulated ini-
tial speeds. When the same scenario is studied for the 
highest simulated speeds, at the moment of ground-
ing of a larger vessel, the speed is on the average 30% 
higher than the speed at the moment of grounding of a 
smaller vessel. If the two already mentioned scenarios 
are analyzed in the fairway where the grounding iso-
bath is 1,000 metres from the planned trajectory, it is 
concluded that the speed at the moment of ground-
ing of the larger vessel will be on the average 170% 
higher than the speed at the moment of grounding 
of a smaller vessel with the minimum simulated ini-
tial speeds, and on the average 50% higher with the 
maximum simulated speeds. Based on the displayed 
results, it can be concluded that during navigation in 
narrower fairways the difference in ship displacement 
will have a lesser effect on the speed of the grounding 
than during navigation in wider fairways.
With regards to the aim of this paper, from the 
above mentioned analyses a conclusion was reached 
that the worst case scenario of grounding for all sim-
ulated vessels will occur when the rudder deflection 
angle is small. If the acceptable risk of grounding is to 
be determined, it is necessary to apply the principle of 
the worst case scenario which leads to the conclusion 
that during data set creation, the number of simula-
tions can be reduced, i.e. it is sufficient to simulate 
only the smallest rudder deflection angle (5°) and to 
vary ship sizes and initial speeds. Rudder deflection 
angles smaller than 5° are very small rudder deflec-
tions, and in view of the extraordinary events analyzed 
in this paper, they are considered to be the ship track 
head reach that will not result in greater drifting from 
the planned trajectory unless the vessel is affected by 
external forces.
6. CONCLUSION
Analyzing the ship movement trajectory after the 
occurrence of the extraordinary event mentioned in 
this paper, it can be concluded that during navigation 
in narrow fairways, the rudder deflection angle has 
less effect on the grounding speed than in wider fair-
ways. Also, a certain correlation is present between 
the difference between the minimum and the maxi-
mum initial speed, and the difference of the ground-
ing speed with respect to the initial speeds. Further, it 
can be concluded that during navigation in narrower 
fairways the difference in ship displacement will have 
a lesser effect on the speed of grounding than during 
navigation in wider fairways.
By comparing the ship movement simulations with 
different rudder deflection angles, it was concluded 
that the worst case scenario during grounding will oc-
cur when the rudder deflection angle is small. Based 
on this finding, it can also be concluded that during 
data set creation, the number of simulations can be 
reduced, i.e. it is sufficient to simulate only the small-
est rudder deflection angle (5°).
The performed simulations can only be applied to 
bulk carriers and tankers. Further research should de-
fine scenarios for other types of ships, as well as for 
other types of extraordinary events. Also, the obtained 
results will be validated in future research by compari-
son with data obtained in experiments with real ves-
sels using various predetermined trajectories.
On the basis of the simulation results, it is possible 
to develop a simulation model that would provide a 
ship movement curve in case of an assumed extraor-
dinary event, and then grounding parameters would 
be obtained for the selected width of the fairway (to 
the grounding isobath). The grounding parameters are 
input data for determining the extent of vessel damage 
in case of grounding, which finally defines the conse-
quence of grounding, one of the parameters neces-
sary for the assessment of the risk of grounding.
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SAŽETAK 
 
SIMULACIJA KRETANJA BRODA NAKON KVARA 
KORMILARSKOG UREĐAJA RADI UTVRĐIVANJA 
NAJNEPOVOLJNIJEG DOGAĐAJA PRI NASUKANJU
Nasukanje broda spada u osnovne pomorske plovid-
bene nezgode, a nastaje zbog pogreške osobe koja uprav-
lja brodom, tehničkog kvara na vitalnim dijelovima opreme 
broda, a može nastati i zbog više sile. Kako bi se smanjio 
rizik nasukanja u takvim slučajevima, u radu je istraženo 
kretanje broda tijekom plovidbe kada na brodu dolazi do iz-
vanrednog događaja kao što je kvar sustava kormilarskog 
uređaja koji izravno utječe na smjer broda, a posredno i na 
brzinu broda. Jedan od načina određivanja kretanja broda u 
takvim okolnostima, što je prikazano u ovom radu, je simu-
liranje kretanja broda na navigacijskom simulatoru prema 
unaprijed definiranim scenarijima. Na navigacijskom simu-
latoru ukupno je istraženo 60 scenarija, pri čemu je varirana 
vrsta broda, veličina broda, brzina broda i kut otklona ko-
rmila. Tijekom provođenja simulacije svakih 30 s bilježeni su 
svi bitni podaci o trenutnom kretanju broda te grafički prikaz 
izvedene simulacije. Na osnovu rezultata simulacija moguće 
je odrediti najnepovoljniji događaj koji se može upotrijebiti 
za određivanje posljedice nasukanja, što je jedan od ele-
menata potrebnih za procjenu rizika nasukanja.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI
rizik nasukanja, kvar sustava kormilarskog uređaja, simu-
lacija kretanja broda, odabir najnepovoljnijeg događaja
REFERENCES
[1] IMO, Formal Safety Assessment, MSC 83/INF.2, 2007
[2] Fowler, T.G., Sørgård, E.: Modeling ship transportation 
risk, Risk Analysis, 20, (2000) 2, 225-244
[3] Amrozowicz, M., Brown, A., Golay, M.: A Probabilistic 
analysis of tanker groundings, 7th International Off-
shore and Polar Engineering Conference, Honolulu, 
Hawaii, 1997
[4] Simonsen, B.C., Hansen, P.F.: Theoretical and Statisti-
cal Analysis of Ship Grounding Accidents, Journal of 
Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, 2000, 
122: 200-207
[5] Bielić, T., Mandžuka, S., Tomas, V.: Model of ship man-
agement in emergency, Promet-Traffic & Transporta-
tion, Vol. 23, 2011, No. 6, 471-483
[6] Lin, R. Q., Smith, T., Hughes, M.: Prediction of Ship Un-
steady Maneuvering in Calm Water by a Fully Nonlinear 
Ship Motion Model, Modelling and Simulation in Engi-
neering, Volume 2012, Article ID 468029, 2012
[7] Lin, R.Q. and Kuang, W.: A fully nonlinear, dynamically 
consistent numerical model for ship maneuvering in 
a seaway, Modeling and Simulation in Engineer, vol. 
2011, Article ID 356741, 2011
[8] Lin, R.Q., Hughes, M., and Smith, T.: Prediction of ship 
steering capabilities with a fully nonlinear ship motion 
model. Part 1: maneuvering in calm water, Journal of 
Marine Science and Technology, vol. 15, no. 2, 2010, 
131–142
[9] Kang, D., Nagarajan, V., Hasegawa, K., Sano, M.: Math-
ematical model of single-propeller twin-rudder ship, 
Journal of marine science and technology, Volume 13, 
No. 3, 2008, 201-222
[10] Sutulo, S., Moreira, L., Guedes Soares, C.: Mathemati-
cal models for ship path prediction in manoeuvring 
simulation systems, Ocean Engineering, Volume 29, 
Issue 1, 1-19, 2002
[11] Cahill, R.A.: Strandings and their causes, 6th ed., The 
Nautical Institute, London, 2002
[12] Kristiansen, S.: Maritime transportation safety man-
agement and risk analysis, Elsevier Butterworth-Heine-
mann, Oxford, 2005
[13] Vinnem, J.E.: Offshore risk assessment, Kluwer Aca-
demic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1999
[14] Diamantidis, D.: Risk acceptance criteria, Joint Com-
mittee of Structural Safety, JCSS, Document #3, 2008
[15] Friis-Hansen, P., Simonsen,B. C.: GRACAT: software for 
grounding and collision risk analysis, Marine Struc-
tures 15 (2002), 383-401
[16] Kite-Powell, H.L. et al.: Investigation of potential risk 
factors for groundings of commercial vessels in U.S. 
ports, International Journal of Offshore and Polar Engi-
neering, 9 (1999), 1, 16-21
[17] Jebsen, J.J., Papakonstantinou, V.C.: Evaluation of 
physical risk of ship grounding, PhD Thesis, Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, 1997
[18] Capability of ship manoeuvring simulation models for 
approach channels and fairways in harbours, PIANC, 
1992
